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Abstract 
Understanding how consumers react to what is happening as a crisis evolves is crucial for 
those charged with risk management and risk communication. Responsibility, blame and 
accountability are important concepts in any crisis, particularly when consumer confidence 
has been damaged. In this article we examine to what extent, and to what effect, 
responsibility, blame and accountability figure in consumer reactions in the immediate 
aftermath of a food crisis. The data we draw on in this article is derived from an online 
engagement study which took place in ‘real time’ as the crisis unfolded. Through this 
study we were able to explore how consumers responded to the adulteration of processed 
beef products with horsemeat in early 2013 in Ireland and the UK. We found that 
consumers attributed causal responsibility and allocated blame for the adulteration to three 
factors, the deliberately deceitful practices of the food industry, the complexity of the food 
supply chain, and demand from (other) consumers for cheap food. We found that 
consumers were willing to begin the process of rebuilding their confidence in the food 
system and accountability was viewed as the primary means for restoring confidence.  
 
 Keywords: risk, accountability; blame; horsemeat; food adulteration, responsibility; risk 
communication, VIZZATA™ 
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Introduction 1 
Food scares can damage consumer confidence in food safety: in particular in the safety and 2 
quality of the food supply; the food industries’ commitment to produce safe food; and the 3 
regulators ability to police the food chain (Houghton et al., 2008). This loss of confidence can 4 
result in consumer reactions that are not justified by the public health risk, fuelled by feelings 5 
of deceit and betrayal by stakeholders in the food chain, sensational media coverage, and the 6 
associated political response (Kasperson, Jhaveri, & Kasperson, 2001). If consumer health is 7 
to be protected and minimal damage done to consumer confidence, appropriate communication 8 
strategies are required from the stakeholders involved (Grunert, 2002). This requires an 9 
understanding of consumers’ concerns to target communications accordingly. Currently there 10 
is limited understanding of consumers response to information in times of a food crisis and in 11 
this article we contribute to this understanding by examining how consumers in Ireland and the 12 
UK responded in ‘real time’ to the 2013 horsemeat adulteration1 incident. In this article we 13 
explore how consumers conceptualised responsibility, blame, and accountability – particularly 14 
important concepts to consider when consumer confidence is threatened.  15 
 16 
Food crises and risk 17 
Conceptualising causal responsibility, blame and accountability 18 
Crises are often characterised by the heavily politicised responses and are marked by 19 
discussions over what caused the crisis, who is to blame for allowing this happen, how the 20 
different parties involved reacted, and what reparatory actions are required (Boin, Hart, 21 
McConnell, & Preston, 2010; Rowe, Hawkes, & Houghton, 2008; Seeger, 2006). Researchers 22 
                                                          
1 We use the term ‘adulteration’ in the current study to reflect a distinct food risk, growing in recognition and 
concern, which involves the intentional substitution or addition of a substance in a food for economic gain 
(Spink & Moyer, 2011). In contrast, food safety contamination incidents involve unintentional acts with 
unintentional harm. Where the word contamination is used in the current paper, we use this in the general sense 
of something being made impure or unclear by contact or mixture. 
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investigating concepts of responsibility and blame in a crisis have tended to focus on how the 23 
media construct stories through the lens of blame and responsibility (Kuttschreuter, Gutteling, 24 
& de Hond, 2011) or the organisational response strategies chosen (Benoit, 1995; Greenberg 25 
& Elliot, 2009; Lachlan & Spence, 2010; Moynihan, 2012). There has been little empirical 26 
investigation of how consumers conceptualise responsibility and attribute blame in the 27 
aftermath of a crisis. This is not surprising given the limited conceptual clarity in the use of the 28 
cluster of related terms including ‘being responsible’, ‘being to blame’ and ‘being 29 
accountable’. These terms are often used interchangeably despite evidence to suggest that 30 
although related, they are conceptually independent (Bickerstaff, Simmons, & Pidgeon, 2006; 31 
Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994). In this article we aim to identify the 32 
distinguishing features of these concepts (causal responsibility, blame, and accountability) and 33 
investigate how they figure in consumer reactions in the immediate aftermath of a food crisis.  34 
Individuals attribute causal responsibility to actors or objects when they identify them 35 
as contributing to the occurrence of the event (Bickerstaff et al., 2006). It is possible to identify 36 
various ways in which consumers can attribute a causal role to individuals and organisations 37 
during a food crisis. Consumers can hold certain individuals or organisations  causally 38 
responsible for an event or see them as causally contributing to the event by the actions they 39 
take or fail to take (Schafer, 1999). Consumers can see these individuals or organisations as 40 
‘complicit’; as Busby argues not as primary agents but as contributors:  41 
 42 
the involvement that various groups have in the generation of a risk, not as primary 43 
agents, nor as the notional risk managers, but as people whose action in some way 44 
contributes to the risk” (Busby, 2008, p. 1571).  45 
 46 
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Thus consumers may look beyond those directly responsible for an event attributing 47 
responsibility more widely across a range of individuals and organisations.   48 
When individuals attribute blame to specific individuals and organisation they judge 49 
that not only did these individual and organisation through their actions or inactions contribute 50 
to the events but they should have prevented the event (Uzzell, Vasileiou, Marcu, & Barnett, 51 
2012). Thus the attribution of blame involves a moral judgement. Such judgement is based on 52 
an assessment of whether the individuals or organisations whose actions or inactions 53 
contributed to the adverse event could have foreseen the consequences of their (in)actions or 54 
could have acted in different ways. Furthermore, the action must have been carried out with 55 
intention and under free will (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002; Uzzell et al., 2012). The concept of 56 
blame is particularly important in relation to risk and disaster. Implicit in the definition of 57 
blame as a moral judgement is an understanding that risk is ‘man-made’. Green (1999) argues 58 
that society increasingly views accidents and disasters as preventable events rather than 59 
unpredictable and random, thus, when a disaster or risk does arise, then someone must be to 60 
blame and held accountable. Douglas in her seminal study of cultural theory (1992), also 61 
highlighted the centrality of a ‘new blaming system’ in society: when a disaster occurs, 62 
individuals or groups will respond by allocating blame in such a manner to protect their own 63 
worldview. There may be a tendency to assume that in times of a crisis, considerations of 64 
responsibility will always result in negative attributions. However, a broader view of moral 65 
responsibility posits that an actor judged to be morally responsible for an event with desirable 66 
or positive outcomes will garner gratitude, respect and praise (Fischer & Ravizza, 2000).  67 
A food scare can be seen as  a ‘fateful moment’, one which challenges taken for granted 68 
assumptions that food is safe and  stimulates  reflection on every-day activities such as  eating  69 
practices based on habit (Eden, Bear, & Walker, 2008). The news that BSE (Bovine 70 
Spongiform Encephalopathy), a disease of cattle, could spread to humans as variant 71 
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Creutzfeldt-Jakob’s disease challenged consumers assumptions that eating beef was safe and 72 
highlighted ‘modern-farming’ techniques in which  herbivorous cattle were fed  bovine meat 73 
and bone meal (Setbon, Raude, Fischler, & Flahault, 2005; Washer, 2006). Such food scares 74 
undermine consumer confidence in the nature and production of food and in different 75 
participants in the food chain such as retailers, food producers, and food regulators (de Krom 76 
& Mol, 2010). When confidence is undermined, for example when consumers are made aware 77 
that labels on food packages do not accurately reflect the contents of the package, then they 78 
expect remedial action such as apologies, reparations, sanctions or penalties. Such action can 79 
reassure consumers that failure of food processing systems is not inevitable, but rather 80 
preventable and remediable (Driedger, Mazur, & Mistry, 2013; Irani, Sinclair, & O'Malley, 81 
2002; Moynihan, 2012). 82 
In this article we focus on how consumers identified those actors they felt should be 83 
answerable for their actions (or inactions) relating to the horsemeat adulteration incident. Being 84 
viewed as accountable need not always go hand-in-hand with attributions of causal 85 
responsibility and blame (Schafer, 1999). For example, organisations which have a role, or 86 
duty, to oversee the activities of other organisations, including food safety agencies, regulatory 87 
bodies, certifying authorities, might be held accountable instead of the organisations directly 88 
involved in an incident. Closely linked to the concept of accountability is that of ‘role 89 
responsibility’ – a term denoting a duty or obligation, where an individual or organisation, 90 
because of their social position, are legally or morally obliged to take a certain course of action 91 
in the face of a given event (Uzzell et al., 2012). Schafer (1999) and  Schlenker et al. (1994) 92 
have argued that that ideas about duties and obligations play a key role in considering what 93 
actors are accountable. Schafer (1999) notes that the responsibilities associated with an 94 
individual’s occupation or profession may influence consumers’ considerations as to their 95 
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accountability when considering what went wrong in the event of a breach in food safety or 96 
quality, and to offer means for solving, resolving, dissolving, or expiating the breach. 97 
 98 
The 2013 horsemeat adulteration incident 99 
On the 15th January 2013, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland announced that frozen 100 
beef burgers on the Irish market had tested positively for pig and horse DNA. These initial tests 101 
revealed predominantly trace levels of horse (and pig) DNA contamination, although, one 102 
burger was found to contain 29 per cent horse DNA. In the weeks and months which followed, 103 
a pan-European problem was uncovered as further testing identified processed beef products 104 
fraudulently adulterated with horse meat in many Member States. Investigations within several 105 
European Union Member States were immediately initiated to determine who was responsible 106 
for this widespread adulteration, an arduous task given the complexity of the food chain.  107 
In this article we examine whether and how considerations of responsibility featured in 108 
consumers’ reactions in the early days of the 2013 horsemeat scandal as details gradually came 109 
to light and various individuals and organisations were implicated. We chose to examine the 110 
views of Irish and UK consumers specifically, as the study took place in the early weeks of the 111 
incident at which point the contaminated products had only been found in the Irish and UK 112 
market. We explored consumers’ attributions of responsibility early in the unfolding of the 113 
incident in order to identify their intuitive strategies of sense-making around concepts of 114 
responsibility in a context and at a time that was characterised by uncertainty as to where the 115 
responsibility lay.  116 
 117 
Methodology 118 
Design  119 
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In this article we draw on a study of ways in which consumers in Ireland and the UK developed 120 
an understanding of the events associated with the 2013 horsemeat adulteration incident.   Most 121 
studies of consumer responses to events such as food incidents are based on survey designs 122 
using interviews or questionnaires. Such surveys provide snapshots of consumer reactions at a 123 
specific time but do not allow for interaction or dialogue between the researchers and the 124 
participants. To overcome such limitations we used an approach that facilitated a degree of 125 
dialogue and interaction. We employed VIZZATA™, a web-based software developed to 126 
explore citizen engagement and deliberation in the form of an asynchronous dialogue between 127 
online participants and the research team (Barnett et al., 2008; Marcu et al., 2014). The platform 128 
enables researcher present study materials (text, images, audio, or video) to participants who 129 
are invited to ask questions and make comments. These questions and comments are sent to 130 
and read by the research team who respond individually, engaging the participants in an 131 
asynchronous exchange. Participants re-enter the online platform for a second phase of the 132 
study and have the opportunity to comment further on the responses they receive. During this 133 
two-way exchange, the participants are able to deliberate about the content presented to them 134 
as well as engaging in commenting, seeking clarification and contextualising or challenging 135 
the communications.  136 
A previous study employing VIZZATATM to investigate the views of dieticians towards 137 
low-calorie sweeteners found that the online platform helped to elicit participant views in a less 138 
demanding environment; not in response to direct questioning and with the anonymity afforded 139 
by the online individual environment. (Harricharan, Wills, Metzgar, de Looy, & Barnett, 2014). 140 
Alternative qualitative methods such as focus groups have the disadvantage that participants 141 
deliberate not only in response to stimulus material but also in response to the voiced opinions 142 
of others in the group, and the risk is that more articulate participants can set the tone of the 143 
discussion or influence others’ responses. Focus groups are also conducive to ‘group think’, 144 
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and the convergence of opinions (sometimes under the influence of social norms pertaining to 145 
conversation) may obscure individual views. Another study which employed VIZZATATM to 146 
investigate consumers views of synthetic meat found that participants were less likely to engage 147 
in question-asking in the focus group setting than in the individual VIZZATATM setting, 148 
perhaps because there is a tendency for opinions to converge in a group setting (Marcu et al., 149 
2014). By contrast, VIZZATATM is well positioned to elicit consumers’ specific questions and 150 
thoughts in response to significant communications as it allows participants the space to focus 151 
on the content of the communication presented rather than on interpersonal exchanges and 152 
opinions of peers.  153 
We started the study soon after the start of the horsemeat incident, when consumers 154 
were being exposed to information from sources that were attempting to explain the incident. 155 
We wanted to capture the consumers’ process of sense-making by creating a platform mirroring 156 
as closely as possible the way consumers might naturally digest information. By employing 157 
VIZZATA™, we were able to deploy the study quickly and to present participants with 158 
multiple media formats such as YouTube videos, newspaper article extracts, press release texts, 159 
website screenshots and images. We presented study material in authentic formats that should 160 
seem credible to participants and stimulate more engagement with the content (Rutsaert et al., 161 
2015). The ‘asking questions and posing comments’ features of VIZZATA™ ensured we could 162 
capture the participants’ immediate thoughts and emotional reactions vis-à-vis the incident. 163 
 164 
Study materials  165 
Content testers When participants enter the online VIZZATA™ platform, they are presented 166 
with a series of content testers, that is information in bite-sized chunks, which can take the 167 
form of text, images, audio, or video. The participants have the option to respond to the study 168 
material as they read it by clicking the ‘Ask a question’ and/or the ‘Make a comment’ buttons 169 
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at the bottom of each content tester page. We gave participants five content testers in Phase 170 
One of the study. These testers included the original Food Safety Authority of Ireland press 171 
release from 15th January, an update from the UK Food Standards Agency from 18th January, 172 
an overview of the media reports on the incident, a YouTube video of the Irish Agriculture 173 
Minister explaining the incident, and a public apology from a supermarket implicated in the 174 
adulteration which had been issued on 16th January. In Phase Two, a week later, a single content 175 
tester provided an update on the latest developments. The text of the content testers is available 176 
from the corresponding author.  177 
We chose content testers to represent a variety of authentic and significant 178 
communications related to the horsemeat incident circulating in the public domain at the time. 179 
We decided on the content testers in consultation with the whole research team who are all 180 
authors of this article. We chose content testers to reflect the main themes being communicated 181 
publicly and the main stakeholders communicating in the public sphere at the time. Whilst the 182 
information in the content tester provides a frame for responses, its main value is eliciting 183 
participants’ own comments and questions in response to the content rather than, as is often the 184 
case in survey research, simply seeking answers to questions. Although framing is an issue 185 
with all types of studies (for example questionnaires frame the type or range of responses, while 186 
focus groups frame the responses in line with social norms and group dynamics), we 187 
acknowledge that there is more explicit framing in the current study with the use of stimuli 188 
such as the content testers but we view this as a parameter of the current study, rather than a 189 
limitation.  190 
 We employed multiple content testers (using multiple formats), which presented a 191 
broad display of perspectives from various stakeholders communicating during the horsemeat 192 
incident. These were real communications which were available in the public domain and 193 
which consumers could use to make sense of the incident in the context of their everyday lives. 194 
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Contrary to user-generated data on social media such as tweets or online comments, a 195 
VIZZATA™ study enables us to capture consumers’ reactions as responses to specific, 196 
structured, online content rather than as reactions to other consumers’ views (see Regan et al., 197 
2014 for a detailed discussion of consumers’ online comments as a source of data). With user-198 
generated data online, the profile of those commenting is generally unknown or cannot be 199 
reliably verified; in contrast, the VIZZATA™ study enabled us to recruit participants in a 200 
systematic way and to obtain verifiable demographic information. 201 
 202 
Open-ended questions The VIZZATA™ platform also provides the facility to ask participants 203 
open-ended questions. Following the presentation of the content testers, Phase One of the study 204 
ended with following five open-ended questions: 205 
 206 
 Is there anything worrying about this incident?  207 
 In what ways, if any, do you think this incident has been well managed? 208 
 In what ways, if any, do you think this incident has been poorly managed?  209 
 Has this incident made any difference to how confident you are about what is in your 210 
food?  211 
 Do you have any more thoughts or comments on this topic?  212 
 213 
In Phase Two we also used the facility asking participants how their understanding of the event 214 
had changed as a result of taking part in the study and how they felt the issue had been managed 215 
by the authorities in Ireland and the UK. The open-ended questions which followed the content 216 
testers provided us with an opportunity to obtain some more structured reflections on 217 
conceptual issues of interest including: perceptions of a risk;  public appraisal of risk 218 
management approaches; and the potential for lasting impacts of a crisis event (such as 219 
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impaired confidence in food supplies). These issues guided our construction of the open-ended 220 
questions and ensured we captured a comprehensive overview of how consumers were reacting 221 
to the incident. We used wording which was neutral and non-directional so as to avoid framing 222 
responses. 223 
 224 
Participants  225 
To ensure timely recruitment of participants, we used an international recruitment agency 226 
which specialised in online research (Toluna). Participants were recruited from their national 227 
online panels of participants, who had never before been involved in a VIZZATA™ study. 228 
Toluna employs panel quality-control measures (see http://www.toluna-group.com/about-229 
toluna/about/data-quality-approach). To allow for non-completion rates, 60 potential 230 
participants were approached: 30 from the United Kingdom and 30 consumers from the 231 
Republic of Ireland. These participants were identified from the online panel using a screener 232 
questionnaire which ensured that they met the inclusion criterion of consuming red meat on a 233 
regular basis. The profiles of the 44 participants who completed the study are in Table 1. It is 234 
possible that the views of some social groups are under-represented in the current study; for 235 
example, we do not have information on the socio-economic background of our participants. 236 
As this is a qualitative investigation, we did not seek to obtain a representative sample of the 237 
general population in Ireland and in the UK; we sought to carry out an in-depth investigation 238 
of the range of opinions and responses consumers had in the early days of the horsemeat 239 
incident.  240 
 241 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 242 
Procedure  243 
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Our study went live on the 19th of January; four days after the initial Food Safety Authority of 244 
Ireland press release on the horsemeat incident. Upon receiving a list of eligible participants 245 
from the recruitment agency, we invited the 60 participants, via email, to the website hosting 246 
the VIZZATATM tool. Participants were well informed at all stages of the study, starting with 247 
an e-mail which explained who we were, a short description of the study topic, and an 248 
indication of the study format, before inviting participants to take part. Upon entry into the site, 249 
the participants were presented with an introductory page explaining the nature and purpose of 250 
the research in detail. The voluntary nature of the study was emphasised and participants were 251 
asked to provide informed consent by ticking agreement before proceeding into the study itself, 252 
where they were presented with a sequence of 5 content testers. Phase One of the study closed 253 
on the 21st January and over 22nd and 23rd of January, the first, second, and third authors 254 
responded to the individual comments and questions. Similar questions and comments were 255 
grouped together, for example health-related questions/comments, testing-related 256 
questions/comments, and generic answers were first prepared using official sources such as 257 
official press releases, websites, policy reports. Using this information, we then tailored each 258 
response to the participant’s individual question and/or comment. We were explicit about 259 
uncertainties where relevant. When providing information to the participants on the answering 260 
process (both at the beginning of the study, and at Phase Two of the study), we stated that our 261 
responses to their questions were provided from our position as social science researchers, not 262 
as specialists in this area – however we assured them that official and reliable sources were 263 
used for all answers and efforts were made to point the participant in the direction of these 264 
where applicable. We sent responses via e-mail to the participants on the 23rd and 24th of 265 
January, and they were invited to Phase Two of the study on the 25th January. We explained 266 
that feedback would not be provided to questions and comments made to the final content 267 
tester. We closed the study after Phase Two. We debriefed participants on the study and gave 268 
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each participant a €20 voucher to compensate them for the time they spent on the study. At all 269 
stages of the process, we provided a name and e-mail address of a research team member both 270 
in Ireland and in the UK for participants to contact should they have any concerns or queries 271 
on the study. All data collected was anonymised and treated confidentially, with access to the 272 
data restricted to the research team. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the 273 
VIZZATATM process. 274 
 275 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 276 
 277 
Analytic procedure  278 
We downloaded all the data into a CSV file and used QSR International’s NVivo 9 qualitative 279 
software to organise the data analysis. The dataset consisted of all questions and comments 280 
arising from the content testers and all replies to the open-ended questions (See Table 2). We 281 
adopted a qualitative inductive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), analysing all relevant 282 
extracts that we considered relevant to the research objectives. We developed a coding 283 
framework that we continuously developed, using a method of ‘constant comparison’ – 284 
emerging codes were compared with established codes to merge similar codes together. We 285 
merged codes to begin the process of identifying themes: themes that represented broad 286 
recurring patterns in the data. The research team discussed and refined these themes and 287 
adopted illustrative names and definitions for each of the themes. 288 
 289 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 290 
 291 
Findings 292 
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Our thematic analysis based on 60 coding categories enabled us to identify 5 overarching  293 
themes. These themes are illustrated in the thematic map in Figure 2, and reflect how 294 
consumers made sense of the incident by thinking about – and ascribing – blame, responsibility, 295 
and accountability to the various actors involved, and the function served by this reasoning. In 296 
the following sections, we discuss the themes with illustrative quotes from the participants. 297 
Next to each quote, in brackets, we report the nationality, gender and age-range of the 298 
participants.  299 
 300 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 301 
 302 
Deliberately deceitful food industry 303 
Participants made sense of the incident by speculating about the cause of the adulteration. 304 
Participants largely viewed the adulteration as having occurred as a result of direct actions of 305 
those in the food industry. On the whole, these attributions of causal responsibility were 306 
reflected as attributions of blame. These participants established this link by arguing that those 307 
involved in producing the food products had deliberately adulterated and mislabelled products, 308 
with clear intention that consumers would be misled and would purchase adulterated meat 309 
products. Thus participants argued that the addition of undeclared ingredients and the 310 
mislabelling of contents was seen as a deliberate and deceitful activity; their comments and 311 
questions spoke of ‘deceit’, ‘lies’ and ‘abuses’: 312 
 I am worried that different substances are being put into food, but it’s not being 313 
put on the packaging, so consumers can make an informed choice about whether 314 
to buy it or not. It’s a very deceitful practice. (UK, Female, 31-35) 315 
Participants were concerned about how widespread these deceitful practices might be in the 316 
food industry, reinforcing their suspicion that there had been sustained and deliberate food 317 
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fraud that had been covered up by the food industry and that the horse-meat scandal was not 318 
one-off accidental contamination. Imagining such ‘worst case scenarios’ enabled them to 319 
express how their confidence in the food industry had been significantly undermined: 320 
What is the possibility of similar adulteration in other meat products or even 321 
wider food categories? How long have we been consuming such adulterated 322 
meat? (Ireland, Female, 31-35) 323 
Most participants saw deceit as part of the food industries collective culture. However, some 324 
participants did highlight the role of specific individuals and organisations within the food 325 
industry. A number of participants argued that within an organisation, blame should not be 326 
distributed equally, as they felt it was often the case that these acts of deceit were perpetrated 327 
by those at the managerial level whilst workers on the ground were unwitting accomplices: 328 
Cut out the ‘skulduggery’ and deception, it is sad to see 150 job losses to 329 
innocent people, this is the fault of management not doing their job properly 330 
and ensuring a ’clean‘ product be sold for human consumption, why did the 331 
meat processing plants jeopardise these jobs? I feel they all thought they could 332 
get away with it. (Ireland, Female, 51+) 333 
A small number of participants speculated that the contamination may have resulted from a 334 
technical or systems error. Amongst this minority, although there were judgements of causal 335 
responsibility, there was a distinct absence of any moral judgement of deliberate or intentional 336 
fault and they tended not to attribute blame. These judgements appeared to focus on the fact 337 
that, at this early stage, the majority of the contamination was found to be trace amounts. These 338 
participants also tended to be more inquisitive and speculative than other participants, 339 
suggesting that they were still trying to make sense of what had happened, not ruling out any 340 
of the possible causes: 341 
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Could the DNA be there because machinery has not been cleaned correctly 342 
between the different uses of the meat? For example, making dog or cat food, 343 
and then making burgers. (UK, Female,36-40) 344 
 345 
Complexity of food systems  346 
Most participants felt that the direct causal actions of the primary perpetrators – individuals 347 
and organisations in the food industry – had been facilitated by the complexity of the food 348 
processing system and the actions (and inactions) of a range of individuals and organisation 349 
operating in it. They felt that inadequate monitoring and testing processes enabled the 350 
adulteration to occur and go undetected for a long period of time. Many participants questioned 351 
why quality control tests had not identified the contamination prior to the products reaching 352 
the market: 353 
How good than are the tests and checks, which should be carried out, at the 354 
production stage? Should this not have been found before the product reached 355 
the point of sale? (UK, Female, 51+) 356 
Participants viewed those individuals and organisations who were responsible for overseeing 357 
and monitoring the safety and quality of the food supply as having indirectly contributed to the 358 
occurrence of the adulteration, primarily by their lack of action. There was a sense that these 359 
actors, including retailers, the food industry, and authorities, had been ‘asleep on the job’ and 360 
had failed in their obligations and duties such as  adequately testing and checking the 361 
ingredients and products. Some participants voiced concern that retailers were not carrying out 362 
satisfactory quality control checks on their suppliers. Participants considered it to be the 363 
responsibility of retailers to detect contaminated products before they reached their shelves:  364 
 Conceptualising responsibility 
18 
 
It’s all very well for [the supermarket] to be doing an investigation now. They 365 
should be making routine checks on their suppliers, to ensure the safety and 366 
integrity of our food.  (Ireland, Male, 41-50)  367 
Participants also criticised the quality control systems and monitoring processes of the 368 
authorities and regulatory bodies which had failed to identify the adulteration. Participants 369 
argued that the regulatory agencies and their staff were put in place to detect and prevent 370 
fraudulent activity but were obviously not fit for purpose: 371 
The department have vets and checks in place in factories. Why did they not 372 
find out the make-up of the imported product before it hit the food chain. 373 
(Ireland, Female, 51+) 374 
In considering the complexity of the food system, participants reflected on the wider political, 375 
social, and economic processes which had facilitated the food industry’s adulteration activities. 376 
For example, a number of participants acknowledged a complex backdrop of the economic 377 
downturn, austerity programmes, and political reorganisation of various regulatory bodies: 378 
Is it because of repeated Government cuts, that the FSA (Food Standards 379 
Agency) were unable to find the adulteration of some ‘Beefburgers’. Have 380 
staffing and funding levels been reduced to the point where contamination of 381 
foodstuffs will go undetected? (UK, Male, 51+) 382 
Other participants viewed cost-cutting and profit-making measures as motivators for the illicit 383 
actions in the food industry. Some felt that it was retailers’ pressure on producers to supply 384 
product at competitive prices that led them to cut corners:  385 
 My main issue is the large supermarkets push the producers and suppliers to 386 
reduce their costs and prices to gain lower pricing on the shelves. What is 387 
worrying is there seems to be little concern for quality of these products. 388 
(Ireland, Male, 41-50) 389 
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The participants felt the regulatory agencies and their staff were only indirectly causally 390 
responsible for the incident, and a blame discourse in discussions of the actions (or lack of 391 
actions) of these actors was notably absent. There was no indication that the participants 392 
believed that the regulatory agencies and their staff had deliberately neglected to carry out 393 
adequate testing or colluded with the food industry to bring about the adulteration. Whilst 394 
participants did not blame them they still made moral judgements about the regulatory agencies 395 
and their staff holding them responsible for failing to stop the adulteration.   396 
 397 
Consumer demand   398 
A substantial minority of participants argued that consumers, though not themselves, had to 399 
bear some of the responsibility, albeit, the tone was less accusing than in previous themes 400 
discussing causal responsibility. The act of directing responsibility to other consumers 401 
appeared to be less about seeking accountability and retribution; rather, it functioned as a way 402 
for individuals to distance themself from the threat and maintain confidence in the food system 403 
and in their own judgement and food choices. Some participants argued that consumer demand 404 
for cheap produce was a contributing factor in the breakdown of aspects of the food system: 405 
People should understand if they want cheap food products things like this are 406 
bound to happen. (UK, Male, 51+) 407 
Thus blaming other consumers was a way for some participants to distance themselves from 408 
any personal moral responsibility. They stated that they ‘knew better’ than to buy cheap 409 
processed food products:  410 
I've never really had any confidence in processed pre-packaged foods. It makes 411 
me feel that cooking everything from scratch has definitely been the right 412 
choice. (UK, Female, 25-30) 413 
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However, a small number of participants noted that some consumers struggle financially and 414 
have no option but to purchase value-range products however they felt this did not absolve 415 
food manufacturers, supermarkets and regulators for ensuring that such cheap food was safe. 416 
Some of us cannot afford to buy all fresh products and processed meats are a cheap 417 
way to feed a family. But you should still expect (some quality) in the item. It’s 418 
wrong to suggest otherwise. (Ireland, Female, 41-50) 419 
 420 
The need for accountability  421 
The participants in our study stated that those in the food system (including the food producers, 422 
retailers, and government or regulatory figures) who they identified as having causally 423 
contributed to the occurrence of the horsemeat incident should be held to account for their 424 
(in)actions. The participants described accountability as much more than just having been 425 
responsible for the incident’s occurrence; there was a sense that there should be consequences 426 
if things went wrong. Participants viewed these actors as duty-bound to be liable, or 427 
answerable, to the consumer when things went wrong (Schafer, 1999; Schlenker et al., 1994). 428 
Demanding that these actors be held accountable illustrates how the participants expected them 429 
to be answerable for their role in causing, facilitating or permitting food adulteration, to account 430 
for what they did or failed to do, to fix the problem, and if necessary, face sanctions and make 431 
apologies and reparations: 432 
I think that this should be a sign for food companies to clean up their act…I also 433 
think that government deterrents and huge fines should be put in place for every 434 
part of the food chain to make everyone responsible for their actions. (UK, 435 
Male, 41-50) 436 
The participants appeared to link their reasoning on the causal role different actors had played 437 
in the horsemeat incident and their views on the manner in which these actors should be held 438 
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accountable. For those in the food industry who they judged as having been directly responsible 439 
for the food adulteration and who they argued were both responsible and blameworthy, 440 
participants called for fines, sanctions, and criminal prosecutions:   441 
People like him (named food producer) should be banned for life from having 442 
anything to do with food processing as he can't be trusted to obey rules 443 
regulations, or laws. The management of these companies found to be involved 444 
should be charged with a crime. (Ireland, Female, 51+) 445 
Participants also argued that regulators who had failed to prevent food adulteration should be 446 
accountable. Participants called for them to take action to ‘fix’ the processes which had 447 
facilitated and indirectly caused the adulteration, that is inadequate testing and monitoring 448 
conditions: 449 
I think the inspection process along the whole food chain of these products 450 
should be reviewed to ensure the public that measures are being taken and these 451 
measures should be published. (UK, Male, 41-50) 452 
Participants’ views that individuals and  organisations be accountable through visible and 453 
specific acts such as closing factories, paying fines, issuing reports, was a way in which they 454 
could  voice their concern and emphasise the seriousness of the situation. It was a way in which 455 
participants could make sense of a complex situation in which there were uncertainties about 456 
how adulteration had happened and who was at fault.   457 
 458 
Restoration of confidence  459 
For many participants, the confidence they had previously had in the processed meat sector had 460 
been undermined. Most participants expressed a strong sense of disgust, moral outrage, and 461 
betrayal at the thought that horse meat (traditionally not a food animal in these cultures) had 462 
entered the food chain. Indeed all the participants accepted that this adulteration was a ‘crisis’ 463 
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or ‘scandal’ even though three was no direct threat to public health. Participants felt they had 464 
the right to expect and be confident that a purchased food product lived up to their expectations 465 
of quality and safety: 466 
 If these products were labelled "Horse meat burgers" that would be fine but as 467 
they are ‘Beefburgers’ we have the right to expect that they are made from beef. 468 
(UK, Male, 51+) 469 
The horsemeat incident forced participants to reconsider and reflect on their confidence in the 470 
‘purity’ of food. Their search for accountability, blame and punishment reflected their desire 471 
to have their confidence restored. For participants there was a sense that holding individuals or 472 
groups accountable enabled them to believe that such incidents could and would be prevented:   473 
I think they (the authorities) need to assure the public that they are determined 474 
to stamp this out for once and for all and that someone shall be held responsible, 475 
then follow through and bring criminal charge so to  ensure that this shall never 476 
happen again. (Ireland, Female, 51+)   477 
Furthermore participants’ willingness to have their confidence restored by appropriate actions 478 
by those responsible was reflected in their praise for individuals and organisations who had at 479 
an early stage publically accepted responsibility and apologised for the adulteration. Most of 480 
the participants praised a supermarket’s decision to run a full page newspaper advertisement in 481 
which the supermarket admitted and apologised for its role in the adulteration (this 482 
advertisement was used as content tester 4 in VIZZATATM). The participants did not feel that 483 
the apology absolved the supermarket from responsibility for the adulteration, they noted that 484 
the supermarket had facilitated it through inadequate checking and testing. However most of 485 
the participants accepted this admission increased their confidence in the food products sold 486 
by the supermarket:  487 
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It does seem that [the supermarket] are determined to do right by their 488 
customers, and are taking responsibility for their part in this fiasco, this will 489 
inspire confidence in their integrity to supply authentic products. (Ireland, 490 
Female, 51+) 491 
Participants’ appraisal of the role of the individuals and organisations in the scandal seemed to 492 
be as much influenced by the ways in which these individuals and organisation responded to 493 
the evidence of contamination as to their actual role in causing it. Most participants felt that 494 
the response had been prompt and investigations underway quickly, although a small number 495 
did query and criticise the decision of the Irish authorities to delay initial test results available 496 
in December. That said, many participants praised the Food Safety Authority of Ireland for 497 
detecting the adulteration as part of their routine testing and successfully carrying out its 498 
commitment to monitor the quality of the Irish food chain. For participants this evidence that 499 
there was a vigilant organisation provided a basis of confidence that it could prevent such 500 
adulteration happening again: 501 
…granted it will question traceability but at least they started dealing with it 502 
immediately and wasn't it great that they were doing their jobs by testing the 503 
meat! The fact it was traced in Ireland should mean that we still take pride in 504 
our exports and take responsibility should something go wrong. (Ireland, 505 
Female, 25-30) 506 
Participants especially in Ireland felt that the government had responded quickly and positively 507 
to the adulteration. However participants qualified their support for actions by the government 508 
and government agency noting that it was important that they should sustain their vigilance 509 
and should ensure the perpetrators were identified and punished:  510 
It has been well managed by Simon Coveney [Irish Minister of Agriculture] 511 
taking responsibility and making it public, thereby instilling confidence that he 512 
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is determined to ‘root out’ the wrongdoings and get to the truth of this matter, 513 
this does give hope that his intention is for transparency , let's hope there shall 514 
be accountability. (Ireland, Female, 51+) 515 
 516 
Discussion 517 
Concepts of responsibility, blame and accountability are particularly relevant in a crisis as such 518 
situations generally present a threat to consumer confidence. However, previous researchers 519 
have raised concerns regarding the uncritical treatment which these related, but independent, 520 
concepts have received (Bickerstaff et al., 2006). In this article and in line with previous 521 
theoretical thinking, we were able to access data from individuals during the early stage of the 522 
horsemeat scandal that provided insight into the ways in which members of the public used 523 
concepts such as responsibility, blame and accountability. Participants in our study divided 524 
causal responsibility for the adulteration amongst blameworthy perpetrators, the food 525 
producing industry, and unwitting accomplices such as the individuals and agencies 526 
responsible for testing and monitoring the food chain including retailers and authorities. For 527 
participants blame functioned as an added layer to attributions of causal responsibility, and in 528 
line with previous conceptualisations of this concept (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2002; Uzzell et 529 
al., 2012), was directed only at individuals and organisations in the food industry that were 530 
viewed to have acted intentionally. For participants accountability was a process in which 531 
individuals and organisations who contributed to the occurrence of the adulteration were held 532 
accountable – with the expectation that there would be consequences in the form of reparations, 533 
penalties, or sanctions. Enhancing understanding of how and why consumers attribute 534 
responsibility in a food incident is a valuable activity as it increases our understanding of the 535 
triggers of public disquiet and the actions which members of the public value in addressing the 536 
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incident and can have direct implications for improving communication strategies in times of 537 
crisis. 538 
However it is important to note that some participants felt that some consumers should 539 
bear some responsibility for the adulteration, because they wanted ‘cheap’ produce. This 540 
‘othering’ of blame is not uncommon: ‘victim blaming’ can act as a protective device by which 541 
individuals can distance themselves and their own group who behave reasonably and 542 
responsibly, in this case by buying more expensive and safe food, from others whose 543 
irresponsible actions are a threat, in this case buying cheap contaminated food (Mayor et al., 544 
2013; Napier, Mandisodza, Anderson, & Jost, 2006). In our study, consumers may have been 545 
maintaining their faith in the food system by engaging in othering and blaming other 546 
consumers.  This links in with the work of Douglas (1992), who described how individuals or 547 
groups will respond to a risk by allocating blame in a way that protects their own value 548 
positions. However, this was clearly a contentious issue as a number of the participants in the 549 
current study argued that quality should not have been compromised irrespective of price, a 550 
sentiment also echoed by many consumer bodies and authorities as the incident progressed in 551 
the subsequent months.  552 
Our research adds to existing knowledge on restoring confidence in the aftermath of a 553 
crisis. When there is a failure in the normal operations of the food chain, holding individuals 554 
and organisation accountable is a vital activity in order to minimise impacts on confidence and 555 
begin the process of rebuilding confidence (Driedger et al., 2013). People can only place faith 556 
in a system when they perceive those who are operating the system are committed to the general 557 
good, in this case safe food, not in pursuing their own self-interest, minimising costs by 558 
contaminating or adulterating food.  The food production processes are not transparent to 559 
consumers, and consumers can only rely on labels, food quality assurance schemes, brands, 560 
retailers, and even price, as indicators  of authenticity, purity and quality (Eden et al., 2008; 561 
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Van Wezemael, Verbeke, Kugler, de Barcellos, & Grunert, 2010; Verbeke et al., 2010). 562 
Accountability within the food processing sector is vital as it allows consumers place 563 
confidence in a system that is otherwise opaque to them.  564 
The participants in our study wanted to ensure that accountability was enforced through 565 
penalties, fines, and sanctions and that these served as visible indicators that reparation had 566 
been made and that confidence was possible again. However, accountability of this form in the 567 
immediate aftermath of a food crisis is difficult to enforce. As noted by a report from the UK’s 568 
National Audit Office which scrutinises public expenditure on behalf of the UK’s Parliament: 569 
‘six months on, inquiries are still ongoing and the original source of the adulteration has not 570 
been identified’ (Morse, 2013). Establishing and enacting accountability is a slow but vital 571 
process. Thus, ‘accountability mechanisms’ such as ensuring a transparent communication 572 
strategy and informing the public regularly are often put in place in the wake of a crisis to 573 
enhance confidence (Driedger et al., 2013). To rebuild confidence, it is vital that efforts should 574 
be made to communicate and engage with the public to keep them updated and informed on all 575 
efforts being employed to identify those responsible and to hold them accountable. This may 576 
go a long way to rebuilding confidence in the food supply chain, thus allowing consumers to 577 
resume their routine habitual eating activities, with no concern for risk.  578 
Further evidence of the participants’ desire to restore confidence in the food system was 579 
their willingness to praise those individuals and organisations that they judged to have been 580 
accountable during the crisis. Our findings indicate that individuals want to have faith in food 581 
systems and those involved in it – and they seek good reason to do so.  Organisational responses 582 
to crisis situations can determine the extent to which the public will hold the organisation 583 
responsible for contributing to or exacerbating the problem, and the degree to which confidence 584 
in the organisations might be impacted on as a result (Driedger et al., 2013). In the current 585 
study, the supermarket was appraised positively in light of its decision to hold itself accountable 586 
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for its role in the incident by issuing an apology to its consumers. Although participants did not 587 
absolve the retailer of responsibility for their alleged role in facilitating the adulteration, such 588 
apologies were welcomed and could go some way to restoring the reputation of those that made 589 
them There is similarity here to the crisis response strategy of Maple Leaf Foods which had 590 
marketed contaminated food during a deadly 2008 listeriosis outbreak in Canada.  During the 591 
crisis, Maple Leaf Foods opted for a strategy of high visibility: rather than avoiding or 592 
displacing blame, they chose to accept full responsibility for the contamination and issued a 593 
public apology to all those affected, which attracted universal praise (Driedger et al., 2013; 594 
Greenberg & Elliot, 2009). The current study adds to this literature by providing direct 595 
empirical evidence that in the midst of an on-going food crisis, consumers positively appraised 596 
communications which accepted, rather than shirked, responsibility. In crisis those involved 597 
tend to try and deny any responsibility or blame (Greenberg & Elliot, 2009; Moynihan, 2012). 598 
There are clear insights from the current study for organisations developing communication 599 
strategies in response to attributions of blame or responsibility. Acceptance of moral 600 
responsibility from the perspective of the consumer is a compelling indication that confidence 601 
can be restored (Greenberg & Elliot, 2009). For an organisation, early understanding of 602 
whether, why and how they are being blamed or held responsible for a crisis event is important, 603 
and this information should inform the development of effective communication strategies that 604 
support endeavours to mitigate negative consequences on confidence or reputation.  605 
VIZZATATM facilitates qualitative enquiry by allowing participants to express directly 606 
their thoughts and to ask questions. The distinctive features of VIZZATATM are the eliciting of 607 
participants’ questions, and their engagement in a dialogue with the research team (whereby 608 
participants’ receive responses to their questions). In this sense, VIZZATATM has advantages 609 
over commercially available survey tools, and at the same time it is more cost-effective and 610 
easier to implement than focus groups. Asking questions requires engagement and 611 
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consideration of the material at hand, it reveals how participants are making sense of new 612 
information, and it can reveal uncertainties and concerns that the participant may have 613 
regarding the provided information (Dillon, 1982; Marcu et al., 2014; Rutsaert et al., 2015). 614 
We investigated public perceptions when the issue was new and unfolding, and thus, it could 615 
be expected that people had many unanswered questions – our study enabled us to find out 616 
what these questions were. The anticipated provision of individually-tailored answers 617 
encourages the participants to attend to the object of investigation (in our case, the horsemeat 618 
adulteration incident) in the interval between leaving comments and questions and receiving 619 
response, and thus it encourages the participants to engage more deeply with the topic of the 620 
study.  621 
 622 
Conclusion  623 
In this article we have examined how participants in our research study constructed and used 624 
responsibility, blame, and accountability in the aftermath of a food adulteration incident. Our 625 
findings reinforce the centrality of blaming as a response to disaster and risk within society 626 
(Douglas, 1992; Green, 1999). The horsemeat adulteration incident is interesting in the 627 
respect that no immediate danger was posed to health, and indeed health concerns were not 628 
the major priority of our participants; still, in our study blaming represented a major response 629 
of the participants. Our findings indicate that one societal function of attributing blame in 630 
response to a disaster is to begin the process of restoring faith when confidence is broken, as 631 
when consumers are misled about the food that they purchase and consume. Consumers did 632 
not engage in a simplified process of blaming, but rather constructed hypotheses about who 633 
was responsible and why, and concluded that no single factor was at fault here, but rather, a 634 
complex variety of factors had ultimately led to the culmination of the horsemeat adulteration 635 
incident in early 2013. Perhaps the most striking finding from this study is the willingness of 636 
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consumers to rebuild their confidence in the food system in the aftermath of an adulteration 637 
incident and processes of accountability appear to be the restoration method of choice.  638 
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Table 1. Profiles of participants per country 743 
Participants’ profiles Ireland (n = 22) UK (n = 22) 
Females 16 12 
Males 6 10 
Age range   
    25-30 1 3 
    31-35 4 4 
    36-40 2 2 
    41-50 8 5 
    51+ 7 8 
Consume red meat at least once a week 22 22 
Consume beef burgers at least once a month 21 15 
Are aware of the horsemeat adulteration 
incident  
21 22 
Shop regularly in at least one of the 
supermarkets affected by the pig and horse 
DNA incident 
22 22 
 744 
Table 2. Number of questions, comments, and replies to open-ended questions left by the 745 
44 consumers in Phase One and Phase Two of the study 746 
 Part One Part Two Total 
Questions 135 9 141 
Comments 157 47 204 
Replies to open-ended questions 195 253 448 
 747 
  748 
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 749 
Figure 1. The VIZZATA™ process for the current study. 750 
  751 
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 752 
Figure 2. Thematic map reflecting how consumers constructed responsibility, blame, and 753 
accountability in the aftermath of the horsemeat adulteration incident.  754 
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